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Abstract 
 
     The purpose of this paper is to compare the distributional characteristics of two presidential 
candidates’ proposed reforms to the US federal individual income tax. Using an anonymous 
sample of tax return data from the Brookings-Urban Institute Tax Policy Center and the Center’s 
simulations of 2009 tax law and the two proposals, we compare the vertical and horizontal equity 
of the three individual income tax regimes. Surprisingly, there is very little difference among the 
three proposed individual income tax regimes in terms of vertical and horizontal equity. 
However, when the initial effective tax rate positions and economic incomes of each pair of 
taxpayers are  compared to the new effective tax rate positions under the two proposals, we find 
that the Obama proposal makes the tax system more progressive than 2009 law. This change is 
much more pronounced than under the McCain proposal. On the other hand, when these initial 
positions are compared to the two proposals viz. a viz. horizontal equity, the McCain proposed 
tax system is more horizontally equitable than 2009 tax law, and more horizontally equitable 
than the Obama proposal is when compared to 2009 tax law.  
 
JEL Classifications:  H24, D31 
 
 
 
1 Marcus Berliant is Professor of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis, email: 
berliant@artsci.wustl.edu, phone: 314-935-8486;  Robert Strauss is Professor of Economics and 
Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University, email: rpstrauss@gmail.com, phone: 412-268-4798; 
Stuart Hiser is Senior Systems Analyst, MCI, email: stu.hiser@mci.com, phone: 719-260-7771.  
The data on 2009 economic income, taxes after credits due under 2009 tax law, and taxes after 
credits due under the Obama and McCain individual income tax regimes that are analyzed in this 
paper were provided by the Brookings-Urban Institute Tax Policy Center. In particular we wish 
to thank Jeff Rohaly and Khae Lim of the Center for providing the Tax Policy Center’s summary 
micro-simulation file that contained economic income at 2009 levels, estimated 2009 individual 
income tax net liability, and estimated 2009 liabilities under the Obama and McCain individual 
income tax proposals as of  September 5, 2008. The results of this analysis are the responsibility 
of the authors, and not attributable to their constituent institutions. 
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I. Introduction 
 
     The analysis of changes in current public tax and transfer policy is often divided into: 1] 
ascertaining the effects of such changes on the level of efficiency of the economy, 2] ascertaining 
the effects of such changes on the amounts of revenues provided to the fisc, and 3] ascertaining 
the effects of such changes on the burden and ultimate incidence of the new tax and transfer 
system compared to the original system. This third analysis is usually called "distributional 
analysis." Who pays for public services under current tax law, and who will pay under a new 
system is often of great public and therefore political interest.2  
 
When choices are to be made among bundles of policies represented by politicians, it is 
important to provide as much information as possible to reduce uncertainty about the 
consequences of the adoption of these policies.  The focus of this short note is on one policy, 
namely tax reform, and only on one aspect of this policy, namely the distributional effect of any 
such change.  Succinctly put, our purpose is to compare the equity properties of current tax law, 
updated to reflect expected income growth and the certain changes in tax law for 2009, with the 
equity effects of the changes proposed by the two candidates for tax year 2009.  
 
 The data we use, provided by the Brookings-Urban Institute Tax Policy Center, is 
generated by an anonymous, random sample of 273,000 federal taxpayers that are weighted to 
represent the entire set of 156 million individual taxpayers in the economy.  The Center obtained 
their data from the Statistics Division of the  Internal Revenue Service, and then generated a 
match to Census Bureau survey data3. The main ingredients for our analysis taken from this data 
are the economic income4, derived from tax forms and Census Bureau survey data in order to 
represent a taxpayer’s overall ability to pay rather than the institutional notions used on tax forms 
such as adjusted gross income, and the taxes actually paid.  The ratio of taxes paid to economic 
income is called the “effective tax rate,” and represents the average tax rate (per dollar) for a 
taxpayer.  The data is updated by the Center to reflect expectations concerning 2009 income 
using projections of the Congressional Budget Office.5  When considering alternative tax plans, 
such as those proposed by the presidential candidates as of early September, 2008, the returns in 
the data are recalculated using the tax forms that would apply for these plans.  An important 
assumption underlying the generation of this data is that the taxpayers do not change their 
behavior in response to the changes in incentives due to the changes in tax law.6  There are two 
reasons for this unrealistic assumption.  First, it tends to be accurate in the very short run, for 
example looking at one year into the future, as it takes some time for taxpayers to adjust their tax 
planning.  Second, the estimates can be biased in many directions by making appropriate 
assumptions about reactions to changes in the tax code.  Thus, we attempt to take a neutral 
stance. 
 
2 Whether or not these three matters are empirically separable is not at issue. In principle, all three should be 
analyzed within a complete model of the economy. However, as a practical matter, both theoretical and empirical 
analyses typically specialize in examining one of the three effects in more detail than the others. 
3 In particular, the Center created a synthetic match to the most recent Current Population Survey as is done by the 
US Treasury and Congressional Budget Office.  
4 For a precise definition of what is used in our data, see 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/numbers/displayatab.cfm?DocID=574 
5 See http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=8917 
6 In economic jargon, we say that all elasticities are assumed to be zero. 
 
For a preliminary look at what is going on in the data, we refer to Figure 1.7  Here we 
have graphed the distribution of effective tax rates, as defined above, for 2009 under current law 
and for the tax plans of the two presidential candidates.  What is obvious at the outset is that at 
least in terms of effective tax rates, it is hard to distinguish among the three.  A second point of 
interest is the large percentage of returns that feature a zero effective rate, in other words they 
pay no tax. 
   
 
Figure 1 
 
Patterns of 2009 After Credit Effective Tax Rates
Current Law, Obama and McCain
Effective Tax Rate=Individual Income Taxes after Refundable Credits/Economic Income (pretax)
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 This figure does not have any information about what part of the income distribution 
those who pay no tax come from.  To investigate this aspect of the tax system, we have created 
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7 We exclude from our analysis throughout this paper 1,063 of the 273,496 tax  returns provided by the Center 
whose effective tax rates are less than -100% or greater than +100%. These outliers account for .8% of 2009 
population taxes.  
Figure 2.  For this graph, we focus on (projected) tax returns for 2009 under current law.  We 
graph the economic income distribution for those who pay no taxes.  It is interesting to note that 
the taxpayers who pay no taxes come from many parts of the economic income distribution. 
 
 
Figure 2 
Distribution of 2009 Economic Income
for Taxpayers with Zero Effective Tax Rate under 2008 Tax Law
(1st through 99th percentiles displayed)
($20,000)
$0
$20,000
$40,000
$60,000
$80,000
$100,000
$120,000
$140,000
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91 94 97
Percentile of Economic Income
E
co
no
m
ic
 In
co
m
e 
in
 2
00
9
 
A more systematic examination of tax equity requires us to look at many other slices of 
both the economic income and tax liability distributions, as well as how the two distributions are 
related.  That is what we attempt next, in Section 2.  Section 3 describes the specifics of how our 
summary measures work in practice; Section 4 presents aggregate and per-capita income and 
revenues; Section 5 implements the index number characterizations of current law and the 
presidential candidates’ tax plans.  Finally Section 6 briefly outlines our conclusions from the 
analysis. 
 
2. Summary Measures of Tax Equity 
 
The availability of anonymous samples of tax return information in the US and other 
industrialized countries, when coupled with the capacity to simulate static or accounting 
portrayals of how a new tax system might change the burden of taxation, has enabled analysts to 
describe who will pay more, less, or the same amount for public services under a different or 
"reformed" tax system. Often such changes are described as desirable or more equitable; 
however, the underlying criteria for measuring equity are often obscured in reaching such 
conclusions. For example, both the US Treasury and the Joint Committee on Taxation, US 
Congress, routinely report how many taxpayers, by income class, face higher and lower taxes 
under proposed Tax System B compared to current law (Tax System A); the average dollar 
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amount per return, by income class, of such changes; and the change in tax burden for 
hypothetical tax returns. Such calculations imply that tax policy makers can judge the desirability 
or political acceptability of Tax System B by examining, for example, whether or not the number 
of taxpayers experiencing a tax reduction exceeds the number of taxpayers experiencing a tax 
increase. 
 
  For social scientists, such counts of "winners and losers" are rather primitive 
characterizations of the distributional effects of tax policy changes. From a positive point of 
view, one must distinguish at the outset between extrapolations from the current distribution of 
taxes, and those observed after the new tax system takes effect and taxpayers have adjusted their 
behavior to the new set of implied incentives (as discussed above). More fundamental, however, 
is the matter of defining more precisely, and then measuring, what "equity" means. Traditionally, 
distinctions have been made between measuring the vertical and horizontal equity of tax systems 
based on whether the pre-tax incomes of taxpayers are different (in which case vertical equity is 
at issue) or similar (in which case horizontal equity is at issue), as well as distinctions between 
distributions of before and after-tax income which have become more or less equally distributed 
as a result of a change in tax law. Presumably, with precise definitions of equity, and their 
systematic application to data, one can reach some conclusions about the equity implications of 
changes in tax law. 
 
    Musgrave and Musgrave [1989, p. 223] provide the following definitions. 
 
    Vertical Equity - The degree to which taxpayers with higher ability to pay in fact pay more in 
taxes. 
 
    Horizontal Equity - The degree to which taxpayers in identical circumstances pay the same 
taxes. 
 
     It is clear that these definitions describe an ideal; that is, which tax systems are 
completely equitable, and therefore should be ranked highest by any index number describing the 
concept. For instance, Dalton [1925] realized that any index number implied a particular ideal 
distribution of income. Thus, the ordering of tax systems needs to be completed to have a well-
specified index number. Since real world tax systems are rarely completely equitable, methods 
for comparing the relative degree of vertical and horizontal equity embodied in tax systems are 
needed to make the definitions and theory empirically relevant. 
 
     Measures of income inequality have been used for the evaluation of tax systems for a 
long time. For example, Musgrave and Thin [1948] propose and use several such measures. 
These simple, univariate index numbers can address questions related to the change in the before 
and after tax income distributions generated by a tax system, but cannot deal with questions of 
vertical and horizontal equity, which generally involve the before and after tax welfare of each 
individual, and how a tax system changes the relative position of an individual in the distribution 
of income. Nevertheless, axiomatic characterizations of measures of income inequality are 
nontrivial; see, for example, Thon [1972]. 
 
     The modern development of index numbers of horizontal and vertical equity is based on 
several principles. First, the theory is driven by axiomatic characterizations of the index numbers 
in question. These necessary and sufficient conditions provide information on the value 
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judgments underlying the empirical use of an index. Second, the index number must be amenable 
to application to the empirical rather than statutory tax schedule. As Gouveia and Strauss [1994] 
demonstrate, and as is intuitively obvious, taxpayers with the same economic income might pay 
different taxes, due to the various exemptions, deductions, and credits allowed by a tax system. 
This also requires that the index number account for the attributes of taxpayers, since provisions 
that apply to nobody should not affect the index number. In fact, as Berliant and Strauss [1996] 
suggest, index numbers do not order tax systems; they order pairs consisting of a tax system and 
a taxpayer attribute distribution. 
 
     In terms of the modern theory of index numbers, it is of course important to expose their 
underlying value judgments.  This is not the appropriate venue for this endeavor, so we refer the 
interested reader to the bibliography. 
 
3. Operational Measures of Vertical and Horizontal Equity 
 
To give the reader a general idea of how these summary measures of income or tax equity 
work in practice, we describe here the specification of the ones we have developed as an 
example, as we are most familiar with these.  The algebra detailing the specification of our index 
numbers can be found in Appendix I.  The algebra detailing the specification of many index 
numbers found in the literature, including the Gini coefficient, can be found in Appendix II.  For 
each of them, cites are given to literature found in the bibliography that both describe the 
calculation of the index numbers and provide characterizations of them from axioms.  In the next 
section, we compute all of these for 2009 under current law and for the presidential candidates’ 
proposals, subject to all of the assumptions we have made. 
 
The first step in describing how our index numbers are constructed is to define the 
classifications of progressivity and horizontal equity. 
 
     It is important at this juncture to discuss a crucial assumption.  We take as given a 
partition of the income distribution into cells of “equals” for the purpose of separating horizontal 
and vertical comparisons. We also take as given a partition of the set of effective tax rates into 
cells, which is used to distinguish “similar” effective tax rates for proportional comparisons. 
 
     Clearly the index number values depend on the precise nature of these partitions. For the 
purposes of giving the intuition for the index numbers as well as developing the theory behind 
them, we take the partitions to be part of the assumptions and hence exogenous. Obviously the 
theory applies for any admissible partition structure.  From an empirical standpoint, the values of 
the index numbers can change with the width or mesh of the partitions. In earlier work, Berliant 
and Strauss [1983], we experimented with the partition structure to determine the consistency of 
the conclusions upon characterizing the effects of various tax reforms.  From an empirical 
perspective, we use relatively narrow bands of the income distribution and check for sensitivity. 
 
     The use of exogenously determined cells of “equals” is clearly a strong assumption. But 
it also has a strong implication. Unlike the remainder of the literature, our framework allows us 
to make a sharp and clear-cut distinction between horizontal and vertical equity, both 
conceptually and empirically. 
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     To describe our index measures of vertical equity and inequity, we follow Wertz [1975, 
1978] and partition comparisons between pairs of taxpayers who are not “equals” into three 
groups: the fraction of pairs of taxpayers for whom a given tax system is progressive, the fraction 
of pairs of taxpayers for whom a tax system is proportional, and the fraction of pairs of taxpayers 
for whom a tax system is regressive. As these will be the vertical measures, we consider only 
pairs of taxpayers who are not “equals.” Below, when the construction of horizontal index 
numbers is described, only pairs of taxpayers who are “equals,” the remainder, are used. We 
shall construct the three vertical measures so that they sum to 1. 
 
     A (vertical) comparison of a pair of taxpayers is “progressive” when both the income and 
effective tax rate of one taxpayer are greater than the income and effective tax rate of the other 
taxpayer. A (vertical) comparison of a pair of taxpayers is “proportional” when the incomes of 
two taxpayers are different, but the effective tax rates are the same. Finally, a (vertical) 
comparison is “regressive” when one taxpayer has a larger income but a lower effective tax rate 
than the other taxpayer in the pair-wise comparison. Counting the number of paired comparisons 
that are progressive and dividing by the total number of paired comparisons between taxpayers 
with different incomes (the vertical comparisons) yields the unweighted progressive index. 
Similar computations yield the unweighted proportional and regressive index numbers. 
 
     Table 1 displays the classifications of these “static” vertical and horizontal equity 
comparisons of pairs of taxpayers, denoted 1 and 2, in terms of their incomes (Y) and effective 
tax rates, t. By “static” we mean the equity classification of one tax system.  
 
Table 1 
Vertical and Horizontal Equity Classifications for  
Static Berliant-Strauss Index Numbers 
 
 
Vertical 
Equity 
Classifications
Horizontal 
Equity 
Classifications 
[1] [2] [3] 
Incomes Y, Persons 1,2 
and Effective Tax Rates t  Y1  >  Y2 Y1  = Y2
 
t1   >  t2 
 
“Progressive” 
 
“Inequity” 
 
 
 
t1   =  t2 
 
“Proportional”
 
“Equity” 
 
 
t1   <  t2 
 
“Regressive” 
 
“Inequity” 
 
 
 
     To ascertain the extent to which taxes are distributed progressively, proportionately, and 
regressively, we take into account not only the number of occurrences of each type of 
comparison, but also the degree of income and effective tax rate disparities. Our subjective 
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judgment is that it matters when scoring such comparisons whether taxpayer A with an effective 
tax rate of 20% and taxpayer B with an effective tax rate of 15% have similar or very different 
incomes. Thus the actual measurement involves the weighting of each comparison count by the 
absolute difference in income of each pair of taxpayers. 
 
Similar considerations argue for taking into account the extent of differences in effective 
tax rates. That is, it seems to matter, if taxpayer A has an income twice that of taxpayer B, just 
how similar (or different) the effective tax rates are for the two taxpayers. For example, should A 
have an income of $30,000 and B have an income of $15,000, the ‘progressiveness’ of the tax 
system would seem to differ if in the first instance the respective effective tax rates were 28% 
and 20% while in the second instance effective tax rates of 32% and 18% Clearly, the former 
would seem to be less progressive than the latter. 
 
     To account for such differences in effective tax rates, we weight the comparisons by the 
ratio of effective tax rates rather than the differences in effective tax rates. We use the ratio for 
several reasons. First, using the ratio differentiates more effectively between a pair of effective 
tax rates that are close to each other nominally but not relatively. A pair of effective tax rates of 
10% and 14% would seem to be much more disparate than a pair of effective tax rates of 46% 
and 50%. While the differences are both 4%, the former pair of tax rates clearly displays more 
disparity. Second, using the ratio of rates deals with proportional comparisons when forming the 
weights for each comparison operation. If one were to form a weight based on the difference in 
effective tax rates, the weight would be zero, whereas by using the ratio the weight becomes 
unity.8
 
     The weighted vertical index numbers are formed as follows. For  each progressive 
comparison, weight by the difference in incomes and the  ratio of effective tax rates, and sum 
over progressive comparisons. Repeat  this procedure for both regressive and proportional 
comparisons as well. Divide each of these sums by the total weighted sum over all vertical 
comparisons. 
 
     Horizontal equity, unlike vertical equity, does not admit of multiple classifications. 
Simply put, horizontal equity means either that equals are treated the same, or not. Accordingly, 
we shall measure the extent to which two persons’ effective tax rates are different or are 
identical. Again, following Wertz [1975], we classify each comparison of a pair of taxpayers 
who are deemed to be “equals.” If a pair of taxpayers who are “equals” in terms of income face 
different effective tax rates, then this is an inequitable comparison for the tax system in question. 
All other comparisons between pairs of taxpayers who are “equals” are classified as horizontally 
equitable comparisons. Dividing these counts by the total number of horizontal paired 
comparisons, comparisons between taxpayers deemed to be equals (operationally, in terms of 
income), the unweighted horizontal equity and inequity index numbers are obtained. By 
weighting each paired comparison by the ratio of effective tax rates  in order to account for the 
extent of inequitable treatment by a tax  system, and then performing the same calculations as for 
the unweighted horizontal index numbers, the weighted equity and inequity index numbers are  
obtained. Notice that each weighted count is divided by the sum over all horizontal comparisons 
of weighted counts. 
 
8 In order to account for possible negative effective tax rates that result from the refundable earned income tax 
credit, the weighting uses the ratio of the ranks of the effective tax rates. 
 
     The weighted horizontal and vertical measures are obtained by making all possible 
comparisons among pairs of taxpayers, and accumulating the weighted comparisons of each type 
of classification. In this sense, the horizontal and vertical measures are quite distinct from each 
other, and the classification system is exhaustive. Note that in the case of the vertical 
comparisons, a tax system may be said to have simultaneously progressive, regressive, and 
proportional components to it. This occurs because comparisons are relative, and the 
comparisons are numerous. For n individuals in an economy, there are n(n-1) total comparisons. 
     
What we call “dynamic” index numbers are used to compare two tax systems, which we 
call A and B. We assume that economic income is independent of which tax system, A or B, is 
imposed. In an application in a companion paper, plan A is the federal income tax system, while 
plan B is the total income tax system consisting of both federal and state taxes. The question 
asked is as follows. Given that both the federal and state tax systems are imposed, what is the 
marginal effect on equity of the state tax system? We refer to Berliant and Strauss [1993] for 
more details on both the description and application of these dynamic index numbers. 
  
     Table 2 provides a summary of the classifications from our “dynamic” index numbers; by 
“dynamic” we mean the equity classification and comparisons of taxpayers 1 and 2, with 
incomes Y1 and Y2, under two tax regimes, A and B.  
 
 
Table 2 
Vertical Equity Classifications for Dynamic Berliant-Strauss Index Numbers 
Tax System B Compared to Tax System A (Current Law) 9
 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
Incomes Y, Persons 1,2 and  
Effective Tax Rates tA , tB
                            
A
B
A
B
t
t
t
t
2
2
1
1 >  
                            
A
B
A
B
t
t
t
t
2
2
1
1 =  A
B
A
B
t
t
t
t
2
2
1
1 <  
Y1  >  Y2
“More 
Progressive” 
“No 
Change” 
“Less 
Progressive” 
Y1  <  Y2
“Less 
Progressive” 
“No 
Change” 
“More 
Progressive” 
 
 
     
 
 
                                                 
9 Berliant and Strauss (1983, 1985,1993, and 1996).  
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 4. Characteristics of 2009 Income, Tax  Data and Proposed Tax Legislation  
 
     In 2009, the Brookings-Urban Institute Tax Policy Center projects that economic income will 
be $12.4 trillion dollars in 2009 prices. Current tax law is projected to create $1.189 trillion of 
net, after-tax credit liabilities or an average of $7,478 per tax return. This represents an average 
effective tax rate of 9.6%. The two presidential income tax proposals, as of September 5, 2008, 
are quite similar with the Obama proposal creating $1.150 trillion in 2009 net tax liability, and 
the McCain  proposal creating $1.121 trillion in 2009 net tax liability. Compared to projected 
2009 tax law, the Obama proposal in 2009 would cut individual income taxes an average of $249 
per return, while the McCain proposal would cut individual income taxes an average of $429 per 
return. (See Table 3 below).  
 
 
Table 3 
Total and Mean Amounts of 
Taxes and  Income Concepts in 2009 
 
Tax Law 2009  Revenues 
Mean 2009 
Revenues 
Effective Tax 
Rates on 
Economic 
Income 
Current Law  2009 $1,189,525,900,000 $7,478 9.6% 
2009 Obama $1,149,891,000,000 $7,229 9.3% 
2009 McCain $1,121,362,900,000 $7,049 9.0% 
Change Analysis   
% Change from 
2009 Law 
2009 Obama –  
2009  Tax Law -$39,634,900,000 -$249 -0.3% 
2009 McCain – 
2009 Tax Law -$68,163,000,000 -$429 -0.5% 
    
Ratio Analysis of 
Proposals    
Obama/Current Law 96.7%   
McCain/Current 
Law 94.3%   
McCain/Obama 97.5%   
    
2009 Income 
Concepts 
2009 Income 
Amounts 
Mean 2009 
Income  
Economic Income $12,395,339,000,000 $77,922  
Cash Income $11,335,215,000,000 $71,258  
AGI $9,172,756,300,000 $57,664  
 
                Source: authors’ tabulations of September 5, 2008 Brookings-Urban Institute Tax  
                Policy Center micro-data file.  
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5. Application of the Summary Measures of Tax and Income Equality to 2009 Data 
Under Current Law and Under the Presidential Candidates’ Proposals 
 
     Next we provide the empirical complement to our discussion of the development of index 
numbers.  First, we present in Table 3 the analysis using our static, weighted vertical and 
horizontal  index numbers. 
 
Table 4 
 
 Static Berliant-Strauss  Index Numbers of Vertical and Horizontal Equity 
US Federal Individual Income Tax in 2009, Obama and McCain Tax Proposals 
 
Static Index Numbers 
Paired Vertical 
Comparisons Current Law in 2009 Obama in 2009 McCain in 2009 
%  of  
Weighted 
Comparisons 
Progressive 82.57% 82.26% 81.66% 
% of  Weighted 
Comparisons 
Proportional 16.02% 16.36% 16.88% 
% of  Weighted 
Comparisons 
Regressive 1.41% 1.39% 1.46% 
Total Weighted 
Static Vertical 
Comparisons 100.000% 100.000% 100.000% 
    
Paired Horizontal 
Comparisons Current Law in 2009 Obama in 2009 McCain in 2009 
% of Weighted  
Comparisons: 
Equity 9.54% 9.15% 9.55% 
% of Weighted  
Comparisons: 
Inequity             90.46% 90.850% 90.45% 
Total Weighted 
Static Horizontal 
Comparisons 100.000% 100.000% 100.000% 
 
Source: authors’ index number calculations with Brookings-Urban Institute Tax Policy 
Center, September 5, 2008 micro-simulation file. 
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It is quite clear that the changes make some difference, but the differences are small in 
magnitude.  The basic reason is that tax reforms leave most of the entrenched system in place.  
This is consistent with our previous work with index numbers applied to tax reform, and in 
contrast with the actual history of index number values over long periods.  We also note that 
under current law, the Bush regime tax cuts expire in 2010.  Only the McCain plan retains these 
cuts, but none of this will be apparent in 2009. 
 
These conclusions are reinforced by our calculation of other index numbers for the 3 
regimes.  These index numbers are based primarily on the after tax income distribution; the 
details of their derivation and calculation along with their sources in the literature can be found 
in Appendix II. 
 
Table 5 
Other Index Numbers based on After Tax Income 
 
 
Other Index Measures based 
on After Tax After Tax 
Credit Economic Income 
Current 2009 law 
after tax after credit 
economic income 
using 2009  
cutpoints 
Obama 2009 Income 
Tax Proposal after tax 
after credit economic 
income using proper 
after tax income cut 
points 
McCain 2009 Income 
Tax Proposal after tax 
after credit economic 
income using proper 
after tax income cut 
points 
Average After Tax Income $70,475 $70,724 $70,904 
         VARIANCE       =   1.31E+10 1.30E+10 1.33E+10 
         CO. OF VAR.    =   1.63E+00 1.61E+00 1.63E+00 
         MEAN DIFF.     =   4.21E+03 4.22E+04 4.24E+04 
         GINI           =   5.97E-01 5.96E-01 5.98E-01 
         ATK. GINI      =   2.98E-01 2.98E-01 2.99E-01 
         CO. OF CONCEN  =   5.97E-01 5.96E-01 5.98E-01 
         ATKINSON .3    =   1.98E-01 1.97E-01 1.99E-01 
         ATKINSON .7    =   4.50E-01 4.49E-01 4.51E-01 
         KOLM           =   7.02E+03 7.04E+04 7.06E+04 
         REL. MN. D.#1  =   8.75E-01 8.75E-01 8.78E-01 
         REL. MN. D.#2  =   4.38E-01 4.38E-01 4.39E-01 
        THEIL #1       =   -1.82E+01 -1.82E+01 -1.82E+01 
         THEIL #2       =   3.45E+14 3.46E+14 3.47E+14 
         THEIL #3       =   9.87E+00 9.88E+00 9.88E+00 
         STD. DEV. LOG  =   1.83E+00 1.83E+00 1.84E+00 
         LOG VARIANCE   =   1.37E+01 1.37E+01 1.37E+01 
        AVG RATE INDX  =   1.22E-01 1.24E-01 1.20E-01 
 
Source: authors’ index number calculations with Brookings-Urban Institute Tax Policy Center, 
September 5, 2008 micro-simulation file. 
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The dynamic index numbers are much more sensitive to changes in tax law.  We detail 
these in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 
 
 Dynamic Unweighted Berliant-Strauss Index Numbers  
of Vertical and Horizontal Equity 
 
Changing from the US Federal Individual Income Tax in 2009, 
to the Obama and McCain Tax Reform Proposals 
 
Paired 
Vertical 
Comparisons 
Changing from 
Current 2009 Law 
to  Obama in 2009 
Changing from 
Current 2009 Law 
to  McCain in 2009 
% of 
Comparisons 
Becoming More 
Progressive 33.44% 25.01% 
% of 
Comparisons 
Becoming More 
Proportional 43.38% 35.28% 
% of 
Comparisons 
Becoming  More 
Regressive 23.18% 39.71% 
% Total 
Comparisons 100.000% 100.00% 
Paired 
Horizontal 
Comparisons 
 Changing from 
Current 2009 Law 
to Obama in 2009 
Changing from 
Current 2009 Law 
to McCain in 2009 
% of 
Comparisons 
Becoming  More 
Equitable 29.44% 49.45% 
% of 
Comparisons 
Becoming   
More 
Inequitable 70.56% 50.55% 
Total Dynamic  
Comparisons 100.000% 100.000% 
 
Source: authors’ index number calculations with Brookings-Urban Institute Tax Policy Center, 
September 5, 2008 micro-simulation file. 
 
 14
6. The Bottom Line 
 
As hinted at by the static index numbers, the Obama plan results in more progressivity 
than the McCain plan, but also in less horizontal equity than the McCain plan.  The differences 
in equity impacts of the two proposals becomes more pronounced when we keep track of 
taxpayers’ initial position. Using our dynamic index numbers, we find that the Obama plan 
results in the tax system becoming more progressive 33% of the time compared to 25% for 
McCain, whereas under the McCain proposal those in the same economic income position find 
their effective tax rates becoming more equal 49% of the time while only 29% of the time 
under the Obama plan. Such a tradeoff between vertical and horizontal equity was suggested in 
some of our earlier work.  However, the message to take home from this exercise is that the 
changes to current law proposed by the candidates do not have a large impact on the equity of 
the tax system in 2009.  It is possible that changes in the underlying economic position of 
many taxpayers, resulting from the effects of financial market turmoil on the real economy, 
may be more consequential than the tax proposals of both candidates. After all, the bail out of 
financial institutions is expected to involve $700 billion or 59% of initially projected 2009 
federal individual income tax liability.  
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Appendix I 
 
Algebraic Statement of Vertical and Horizontal  
Berliant-Strauss Index Numbers 
 
  m    =    # of effective rate classes 
 
  n     =    # of economic income classes 
 
j
iN     =    population in economic income class i, rate class j 
 
j
iY      =    average income in economic income class i, rate class j 
 
j
iD     =    the number of taxpayers in income class i, and change in effective tax rate class j 
 
 q      =  the number of change in effective tax rate classes  
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2. Weighted Progressive Vertical Index: 
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5. Weighted Horizontal Inequity Index: 
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Where δ is the sum of all horizontal comparisons, and is expressed: 
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6. Weighted Horizontal Equity Index: 
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7. Unweighted Dynamic  Progressive Vertical Index: 
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9. Unweighted Dynamic Regressive Vertical Index: 
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     10. Unweighted Dynamic Horizontal Inequity Index: 
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Appendix II 
 
Algebraic Statement of Other Index Numbers    
                    
   n     =    # of economic income classes 
 
   a     =    # of after-tax income classes 
 
   m    =    # of effective rate classes 
 
j
iN     =    population in economic income class i, rate class j 
 
     =    average income in economic income class i, rate class j jiY
 
     =    average income in after-tax income class i iZ
 
      =    population in after-tax income class i iP
 
POP   =    total population 
 
INC   =   total after-tax income 
 
Equation = Index Number  Reference 
   
(06) = Average after-tax income   
(07) = Variance  Kondor 1975 
(08) = Coefficient of variation   Atkinson 1970; Fields and Fey 1975 
(09) = Mean difference  Kendall 1947 
(10) = Gini Coefficient  Pyatt 1976 
(11) = Atkinson Gini  Atkinson 1970 
(12) = Coefficient of concentration  Kondor 1975 
(13) = Atkinson  Atkinson 1970 
AT1:є = .3 
AT2:є = .7   
(14) =  Kolm  Kolm 1976 
(15) = Relative mean deviation #1  Atkinson 1970 
(16) = Relative mean deviation #2  Kondor 1975 
(17) = Theil #1  Bouguignon 1979 
(18) = Theil #2  Fields and Fei 1979; Theil 1967 
(19) = Theil #3  Theil 1967 
(20) = Standard deviation of logarithms  Atkinson 1970 
(21) = Logarithmic variance  Kondor 1975 
(22) = Kuznets ratio = (15)  Fields and Fei 1979 
(23) = Average coefficient of variation 
           of effective rates 
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Algebraic Statement of Other Index Numbers 
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